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ABSTRACT
In this paper we examine the current state of play with regards to
the security of smart city initiatives. Smart city technologies are
promoted as an effective way to counter and manage uncertainty
and urban risks through the effective and efficient delivery of
services, yet paradoxically they create new vulnerabilities and
threats, including making city infrastructure and services insecure,
brittle, and open to extended forms of criminal activity. This
paradox has largely been ignored or underestimated by
commercial and governmental interests or tackled through a
technically-mediated mitigation approach. We identify five forms
of vulnerabilities with respect to smart city technologies, detail
the present extent of cyberattacks on networked infrastructure
and services, and present a number of illustrative examples. We
then adopt a normative approach to explore existing mitigation
strategies, suggesting a wider set of systemic interventions
(including security-by-design, remedial security patching and
replacement, formation of core security and computer emergency
response teams, a change in procurement procedures, and
continuing professional development). We discuss how this
approach might be enacted and enforced through market-led and
regulation/management measures, and then examine a more
radical preventative approach to security.
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Introduction
Over the past two decades there has been a concerted move to network urban infrastruc-
tures to utilize computation to try to solve urban problems and deliver city services more
efficiently. Such endeavors are now encapsulated within the notion of smart cities, a
world-wide movement that seeks to transform urban governance, management, and
living through the use of new networked digital technologies. For advocates, the creation
of smart cities will help address issues of urban resilience and sustainability in a time of
rapid population increases, environmental change, and fiscal austerity (see Söderström
et al., 2014; White, 2016). In other words, smart city technologies are seen to offer an effec-
tive way to counter and manage uncertainty and risk. However, as with previous rounds of
technological adoption and adaptation in cities (such as those related to energy supply,
transportation systems, communication services), they also create a paradoxical situation
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wherein the promised benefits (such as convenience, economic prosperity, safety, sustain-
ability) are accompanied by unintended consequences and new variances of traditional
problems (e.g., reproducing inequality, creating security and criminal risks, environmental
externalities) (See Datta, 2015; Greenfield, 2013; Singh and Pelton, 2013; Townsend,
2013). This paradoxical relationship and the reproduction of urban problems and risks
in a new guise is for the most part ignored in the promotional discourse for smart
cities driven by commercial and governmental interests or is present as a potential new
issue to be “solved” by a further round of technological innovation and capital spending.
In contrast, in this paper we examine this paradoxical relationship in depth, detailing
how smart city technologies designed to produce urban resilience and reduce risks are
actually opening up the urban systems they are meant to augment to new forms of vulner-
ability and risk. In particular, we are interested in considering the balancing point between
reward and risk when previously relatively “dumb” systems are made “smart” through the
introduction of networked computation, and are thus opened up to software bugs, data
errors, network viruses, hacks, and criminal and terrorist enterprise (Little, 2010;
Kitchin and Dodge, 2011; Townsend, 2013; Cerrudo, 2015). We are especially interested
in security vulnerabilities and the extent to which it is becoming possible to hack and
disrupt smart city technologies and to commit new variances of criminal activity.
As the burgeoning literature on crime and the city details, for as long as there have been
urban societies there has been criminal activity and attempts to penetrate, attack, defraud,
and disrupt city infrastructure and public services (Evans and Herbert, 1989; LeBeau and
Leitner, 2011; Hall, 2013). Attempts to limit and defend against such crimes have become
built into the fabric of cities themselves through architecturally enacted defenses, strong
doors, locks, window grills, high walls and fences, security alarms, and CCTV
(Manaugh, 2016). However, history has shown that all these security measures have
some vulnerabilities that criminals are quick to identify and exploit. With time, all secur-
ity, even sophisticated or well-designed solutions, will be defeated (especially if the reward
of success provides sufficient motivation). There is thus a perennial struggle between
defenders and attackers to secure systems that provide adequate protection but are not
so restrictive that they seriously inconvenience users or inhibit essential economic
transactions.
Smart city technologies are no different, being afflicted with a range of security vulner-
abilities and risks, and an ongoing struggle is now evident between the cybersecurity indus-
try and criminals and variously motivated hackers. However, while the base motivations to
break into these systems might remain timeless (e.g., theft, extortion, impersonation, vand-
alism, malicious attack: See Schneier, 2003), the nature of their performance is different.
Because smart city technologies rely on networked digital computation, exploits of their vul-
nerabilities can be undertaken at distance and attacks can be masked, reducing the risk of
detection and capture for perpetrators. Moreover, the use of software tools to automate
hacking has greatly lowered-costs and “super-empowered” individual actors to conduct
virtual criminality against multiple targets simultaneously, potentially affecting many differ-
ent cities. Unauthorized access is often made easier because the so-called “attack surfaces”—
the set of ways that a system might be susceptible to an attack (Bellovin, 2016)—are multi-
plied due to a system’s many interlocking parts, which are owned and controlled by a diverse
set of stakeholders, making it difficult to secure every aspect of a large infrastructure or utility
network (Article 29 DPWP, 2014; Cerrudo, 2015; Durbin, 2015). The rewards for success
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can also be significant, for example in the case of a data breach providing access to millions
of user details, or in the case of vandalism/terrorism shutting down the entire electricity
supply to a city, and can garner large amounts of publicity.
In the first part of the paper we detail the various security vulnerabilities of smart cities
and their associated risks, providing contemporary illustrative examples from European
and North American cities. In the second part, we chart the ways in which these vulner-
abilities and risks are being tackled through mitigation strategies, how these strategies
might be further encouraged and complemented by market-based and governance-
based incentives and regulation, and consider a more radical preventative strategy. Our
approach is normative. Rather than providing another critique of the smart city, this
time by charting the paradoxical situation in which technologies designed to tackle
urban problems are introducing new vulnerabilities and risks, or seeking to frame such
risks within the discourses of the risk society (Beck, 1992), or urban resilience (Mackinnon
and Derickson, 2013), or the political economy of neoliberal smart urbanism (Kitchin,
2014; Luque-Ayala and Marvin, 2016), we are more interested in examining the security
challenges and threats faced by cities today and in the coming decade and how they might
be more effectively mitigated and prevented. Our approach is guided by a recognition that
the use of software systems and networked technologies to manage urban services and
govern cities is firmly established and is only likely to become more entrenched, and by
the need for a coherent approach to security that extends beyond technical solutions.
Forms of Cyberattack and Amplifying Factors
Cyberattacks seek to “alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy computer systems and
networks or the information and/or programs resident in or transiting these systems or
networks” (Owens et al., 2009: 1). There are three distinct forms of cyberattack against
operational systems: availability attacks that seek to close a system down or deny
service use; confidentiality attacks that seek to extract information and monitor activity;
and integrity attacks that seek to enter a system to alter information and settings (such
as changing settings so that components exceed normal performance, erasing critical soft-
ware, planting malware and viruses) without being noticed by the legitimate operator/
owner (Singer and Friedman, 2014). Cyberattacks can be performed by multiple different
actors, from nation state intelligence agencies and militaries, terrorist groups, organized
criminals, hacker collectives, political and socially motivated activists to “lone wolf”
hackers, “script kiddies” and bored teenagers.1 Former FBI Director, Robert Mueller,
has claimed that 108 nations have government funded and directed cyberattack units, tar-
geting critical infrastructure and industrial secrets (Goodman, 2015). Anecdotal evidence
from media reporting indicates a significant increase in organized criminals conducting
thefts and frauds by targeting online systems, including spate of so-called “randomware”
attacks against organizations (Hern, 2016).
In general, cyberattacks try to exploit one of five major vulnerabilities of digital tech-
nologies that are central to smart city systems. The first of these is weak software security
and data encryption. Research by a Carnegie Mellon University team in 2004 detailed that,
on average, there are 30 errors or possibly exploitable bugs for every 1,000 lines of code (Li
et al., 2004). In typical large systems being deployed in cities there are millions of lines of
code that produce thousands of potential zero-day exploits (as yet unknown security
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vulnerabilities) for network viruses, malware, and directed hacks. Moreover, research by
cybersecurity specialists has detailed how many smart city systems have been constructed
with no or minimal security (Cerrudo, 2015). For example, using the Shodan search engine
(www.shodan.io: See Bodenheim et al., 2014) it is possible to find all kinds of digital
devices and control systems connected to the Internet—from networked thermostats
for heating systems to traffic control systems and command-and-control centers for
nuclear power plants—many of which have been found to have little to no security
(such as no user authentication, or using default or weak passwords, e.g., “admin,”
“1234′′). Moreover, city governments and vendors of smart city technologies often
deploy them without undertaking cybersecurity testing (Cerrudo, 2015). In the case of
some “Internet of Things” (IoT)2 deployments, it can be difficult to ensure end-to-end
security because most sensors and low-powered devices on the market do not have suffi-
cient computing power to support an encrypted network link (Article 29 DPWP, 2014).
Where encryption is used, security issues can arise regarding how it is operated
(Cerrudo, 2015).
The second area of vulnerability concerns the use of insecure legacy systems and poor
ongoing maintenance. Many smart city technologies are layered onto much older infra-
structure that relies on software and technology created 20 or 30 years ago, which has
not been upgraded for some time, nor can they be migrated to newer, more secure
systems (Rainie et al., 2014; Cerrudo, 2015). These technologies can create inherent vul-
nerabilities to newer systems by providing so-called “forever-day exploits” (holes in
legacy software products that vendors no longer support and thus will never be
patched) (Townsend, 2013). Even in the case of newer technologies, it can be difficult
to test and rollout patches onto critical operational systems that need to always be on
(Cerrudo, 2015).
The third vulnerability is that smart city systems are typically large, complex and
diverse, with many interdependencies and large and complex attack surfaces. Such com-
plexity means it can be difficult to know what and how all the components are
exposed, to measure and mitigate risks, and to ensure end-to-end security (Article 29
DPWP, 2014; Cerrudo, 2015; Durbin, 2015). Even if independent systems are secure,
linking them to other systems can potentially open them to risk with the level of security
only guaranteed by the weakest link. Moreover, the interdependencies between technol-
ogies and systems mean that they are harder to maintain and upgrade (Sarma, 2015).
Beyond being hacked, the complexity of systems also increases the chances of “normal
accidents” (e.g., programming bugs, human errors) that cause unanticipated failures
(Perrow, 1984; Townsend, 2013).
The interdependencies between smart city technologies and systems have the potential
to create cascade effects, wherein “highly interconnected entities rapidly transmit adverse
consequences to each other” (Durbin, 2015; see also Little, 2010). For example, a cyberat-
tack on an electrical power infrastructure could cascade into an urban operating system
that then cascades into the other systems such as traffic management, emergency services,
and water services. Indeed, this is one of the key security and resilience risks of an urban
operating system, wherein several systems are linked together to enable a “system of
systems” approach to managing city services and infrastructures thus undoing the mitigat-
ing effects of using a siloed approach (i.e., fully separate system with physically indepen-
dent cabling and sources of power, etc.) (Little, 2010). A successful cyberattack on the
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electricity grid has huge cascade effects as it underpins so many activities such as powering
homes, workplaces, and a plethora of other essential infrastructures. For example, a soph-
isticated cyberattack on the software controlling parts of Ukraine’s electricity grid switched
off the power to about a quarter of a million consumers for several hours in December
2015 (Zetter, 2016).
Finally, there are multiple vulnerabilities arising from human error and deliberate mal-
feasance of disgruntled (ex)employees. Technical exploits can be significantly aided by
human error, for example, employees opening phishing emails and installing viruses or
malware, or naively inserting infected datasticks into computers (Singer and Friedman,
2014). In other cases, appropriate security software is not installed or is configured incor-
rectly, or manufacturer installed codes are not changed or system security is not kept up-
to-date (Cerrudo, 2015). There are weaknesses in software system designs such that they
can be easily and surreptitiously sabotaged by disgruntled present and ex-employees. For
example, Goodman (2015) details a case where an ex-employee altered the database
records of a vehicle retailer who was using GPS trackers and remote control boxes to
re-possess cars, randomly disabling cars and setting off their alarms. In addition, criminal
hackers are adept at performing social exploits on trusted employees such as using
phishing to release key information (e.g., usernames and passwords) that facilitate
access. There is also evidence from the Snowden revelations that “insiders” have been
planted by State intelligence agencies with the intention of deliberately compromising
the design of networking hardware and fundamental system parameters to facilitate
electronic espionage, sabotage, and cyber-warfare (Greenwald, 2014).
These vulnerabilities are exacerbated by a number of factors, not least that it is often
unclear as to who is responsible for maintaining security across complex systems and
infrastructures when several companies and stakeholders collaborate in their design,
supply hardware and software, and operate and use various elements (US DHS, 2016).
This is exacerbated with respect to urban management, where city administrations are
under increasing pressure for year-on-year “efficiency” savings that affect security in
three ways. First, there is long-term under-investment in infrastructure maintenance
and an over-reliance on legacy systems. Second, depression of salaries in most public
sector organizations make it more difficult to recruit and retain skilled and motivated
IT staff to properly implement and maintain smart city technologies. Crucial IT mainten-
ance increasingly uses self-employed contractors and outsourced services, on the one hand
deskilling core capacities and eroding institutional memory in the public sector, and on the
other creating distributed accountability with a fractured set of bodies (with contracted
services, service-level agreements, multi-agencies teams, and remote helpdesks) overseeing
security, which often leads to a lack of continuity, coordination, and responsibility. Third,
there is a lack of investment in dedicated cybersecurity personnel and leadership (in the
form of Chief Information Officer or Chief Technology Officer) and Computer Emer-
gency Response Teams (CERTs) in city governments (Cerrudo, 2015). Cybersecurity
expertise is usually limited to a handful of personnel and training across the wider work-
force is limited or non-existent (increasing the likelihood of human error). Any cyberse-
curity plans cities do possess are often siloed with respect to particular systems and
departments so that cross-function assessment and response is lacking (Cerrudo, 2015).
In addition, it is clear that many smart city vendors have little or no experience in embed-
ding security features into their products—despite claims made in their marketing
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literature—and many systems possess significant vulnerabilities (Cerrudo, 2015; Lomas,
2015). Furthermore, these vendors can impede security research by limiting access to
their systems for testing, thus enabling them to continue to release unsecured products
without oversight or accountability (Cerrudo, 2015). Further, too many cities have been
lax in insisting on strong security controls and response within the procurement
process for new systems.
These five forms of cyberattack and amplifying factors mean that smart city technol-
ogies and infrastructures possess a number of security vulnerabilities and risks that are
open to being exploited. In the next section, we detail examples of how specific systems
have been, or could be, compromised, illustrating the potential scale and impact of such
cyberattacks.
Security Vulnerabilities and Risks of Smart Cities
In 2016, the chief information security officer for the city of San Diego government
reported that their systems were being hit by an average of 60,000 cyberattacks a day
(Anand, 2016). The operators of the electricity supply grid in the United States report
being under near constant cyberattack, with one utility recording that it was the target
of approximately 10,000 cyberattacks each month (Markey and Waxman, 2013).
Indeed, all five commissioners of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in the
United States agree that sustained and persistent cyberattacks against the digital infra-
structure controlling the supply grid is the most serious threat to electricity reliability in
American metropolitan areas (Markey and Waxman, 2013). Likewise, the Israel Electric
Corp. reports that its servers register about 6,000 unique computer attacks every
second, with other critical infrastructure also under continuous attempts to gain access
(Paganini, 2013). Many of these cyberattacks are relatively inconsequential, such as ran-
domly directed probes of connected computers and scans across publicly available Inter-
net addresses, and are unsuccessful. However, a small number are much more significant
and involve a security breach. Between 2010 and 2014, the US Department of Energy (that
oversees the power grid, regulates power generation, and manages the nuclear weapons
arsenal) documented 1,131 cyberattacks, of which 159 were successful (Reilly, 2015). In
53 cases, these attacks were “root compromises,” meaning that the attackers gained
administrative privileges to computer systems, stealing various kinds of personnel and
operational information, and potentially doing other damage (Reilly, 2015). In a 2014
study of nearly 600 utility, oil and gas, and manufacturing companies, about 70 percent
reported at least one security breach that led to the loss of confidential information or dis-
ruption of operations in the previous 12 months (Prince, 2014); 78 percent expected a suc-
cessful attack on their industrial control systems (ICS) or supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) systems in the next two years (Prince, 2014).
Similarly, there have been a number of cyberattacks on transport management systems,
as well as proof-of-concept demonstrations of possible attacks. While the idea of crippling
a city by disrupting the flow of traffic by hacking its management is not new—for example,
it was a central plot device in the 1969 heist movie, The Italian Job—it can now be done
remotely and is harder to defend against. For example, a cyberattack on a key toll road in
Haifa, Israel, closed it for eight hours causing major traffic disruption (Paganini, 2013).
A ransomware attack on the San Francisco municipal rail network led to ticketing
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machines being removed from service for two days (Gibbs, 2016). A research team from
the University of Michigan managed to hack and manipulate more than a thousand wire-
less-accessible traffic signals in one city using a laptop, custom-software, and a directional
radio transmitter (Ghena et al., 2014). Likewise, security consultants IOActive Labs have
hacked traffic control sensors widely used around the world and altered traffic light
sequencing and interactive speed and road signs (Cerrudo, 2014). A teenager in Lodz,
Poland, managed to hack the city’s tram switches, causing four trams to derail and injuring
a number of passengers (Nanni, 2013; Goodman, 2015). In the United States, air traffic
control systems have been hacked, Federal Aviation Administration servers compromised,
malicious code installed onto control networks, and the personal information of 58,000
workers stolen (Goodman, 2015). Vehicles are also open to being hacked given that a
new car contains up to 200 sensors connected to around 40 electronic control units and
can connect to wireless networks (Greenburg, 2015).
Indeed, every type of smart city solution and particular system components, including
SCADA systems, the sensors and microcontrollers of IoT, and network routers and tele-
communication switches, are open to various forms of cyberattack. All essential urban ser-
vices including the electricity grid, water supply, and road traffic control rely on SCADA
systems that are used to control functions and material flows. These systems measure how
an infrastructure is performing in real-time and enable either automated or human oper-
ator interventions to change settings. The implementation of SCADA systems can be
traced back to the 1920s, but were extensively rolled out in the 1980s. As a consequence,
many deployments are quite dated and some will contain “forever-day” exploits.3 A
number of SCADA systems have been compromised, with hackers altering how the infra-
structure performs, or causing a denial-of-service, or controlling stolen data. The most
infamous SCADA hack to date was the 2009 Stuxnet attack on Iran’s uranium enrichment
plant in which the system was infected by malware that destroyed a number of centrifuges
by running them beyond their design specifications. By 2010 over 90,000 Stuxnet infec-
tions were reported in 115 countries (Zetter, 2015).
IoT refers to the connecting together of machine-readable, uniquely identifiable objects
through the Internet such that they can communicate largely autonomously and automati-
cally. Some objects are passive and can simply be scanned or sensed (such as smart cards
with embedded RFID chips4 used to access buildings and transport systems). Others are
more active and include microcontrollers and actuators. All kinds of objects that used to
be “dumb,” such as thermostats, domestic appliances, security cameras, and lighting
systems, are now becoming networked and “smart,” generating information about their
use and becoming controllable from a distance. The security of IoT is highly variable,
with some systems lacking encryption or usernames and passwords, and others open to
infection by malware and firmware modification. The complex interdependencies of
IoT mean that it has a large attack surface and multiple vulnerabilities (See Table 1).
Demonstrating the scale of IoT vulnerability, one provocative project, Insecam.org pro-
vides access to the feeds of thousands of unsecured and secured cameras available on
the public Internet from cities across the world (Cox, 2014) (See Figure 1). These
cameras can also be turned off, with some lacking the function to be restarted remotely
(Cerrudo, 2015). Others researchers have shown how to hack into smart lighting and
take over control, with potentially serious consequences for personal safety (Chacos,
2016). In addition, IoT infrastructure can be used to perform other kinds of hacks, as
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Table 1. The dimensions of risk of Internet of Things technologies
Attack Surface Vulnerability Attack Surface Vulnerability
Ecosystem Access
Control
Implicit trust between components
Enrolment security
Decommissioning system
Lost access procedures
Local Data Storage Unencrypted data
Data encrypted with
discovered keys
Lack of data integrity checks
Device Memory Cleartext usernames
Cleartext passwords
Third-party credentials
Encryption keys
Third-party Backend
APIs
Unencrypted PII sent
Encrypted PII sent
Device information leaked
Location leaked
Device Physical
Interfaces
Firmware extraction
User command line interface
Administrative command line
interface
Privilege escalation
Reset to insecure state
Removal of storage media
Vendor Backend APIs Inherent trust of cloud or
mobile application
Weak authentication
Weak access controls
Injection attacks
Device Web Interface SQL injection
Cross-site scripting
Cross-site Request Forgery
Username enumeration
Weak passwords
Account lockout
Known default credentials
Update Mechanism Update sent without encryption
Updates not signed
Update location writable
Update verification
Malicious update
Missing update mechanism
No manual update
mechanism
Device Firmware Hardcoded credentials
Sensitive information disclosure
Sensitive URL disclosure
Encryption keys
Firmware version display and/or
last update date
Ecosystem
Communication
Health checks
Heartbeats
Ecosystem commands
Deprovisioning
Pushing updates
Device Network
Services
Information disclosure
User command line interface
Administrative command line
interface
Injection
Denial of Service
Unencrypted Services
Poorly implemented encryption
Test/Development Services
Buffer Overflow
UPnP
Vulnerable UDP Services
DoS
Mobile Application Implicitly trusted by device or
cloud
Username enumeration
Account lockout
Known default credentials
Weak passwords
Insecure data storage
Transport encryption
Insecure password recovery
mechanism
Two-factor authentication
Administrative
Interface
SQL injection
Cross-site scripting
Cross-site Request Forgery
Username enumeration
Weak passwords
Account lockout
Known default credentials
Security/encryption options
Logging options
Two-factor authentication
Inability to wipe device
Cloud Web Interface SQL injection
Cross-site scripting
Cross-site Request Forgery
Username enumeration
Weak passwords
Account lockout
Known default credentials
Transport encryption
Insecure password recovery
mechanism
Two-factor authentication
Network Traffic LAN
LAN to Internet
Short range
Non-standard
Source: Adapted from Open Web Application Security Project, 2015, https://www.owasp.org/index.php/IoT_Attack_
Surface_Areas (CC-BY) Accessed November 28, 2017.
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with the Dyn denial of service attacks in autumn of 2016 in which many significant web-
sites were disrupted by the Mirai botnet that took over unsecured IoT devices and used
them to bombard Dyn servers (Woolf, 2016).
Smart city technologies are linked together via a number of communications technol-
ogies and protocols such as Long Term Evolution (4G LTE), Global System for Mobile
Communication (GSM), Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), WiFi, bluetooth,
Near-Field Communication (NFC), open wireless standard (ZigBee), and wireless com-
munication (Z-Wave). Each of the modes of networking and transferring data are
known to have security issues that enable data to be intercepted by third parties and
provide unauthorized access to devices. Some of these protocols are so complicated that
they are difficult to implement securely. Likewise, telecommunication switches that link
together the local and long distance Internet infrastructure are known to have vulnerabil-
ities, including manufacturer and operator back-door security access and access codes that
are infrequently updated (Singh and Pelton, 2013). In addition, due to “oversubscribing,”
wherein wireless carriers want to maximize use of spectrum licenses, networks only have
capacity for a fraction of subscribers meaning that during a crisis when demand surges, the
system cannot cope, failing to connect both people and things (Townsend, 2013).
What this discussion highlights is the scale and diversity of security flaws in the smart
city, their potential vulnerability to cyberattack, and the consequences of such attacks with
respect to human safety and social and economic resilience. A key question therefore con-
cerns how such vulnerabilities can be addressed to minimize threats and risk?
Securing Smart Cities: Mitigation and Preventative
To date, the strategy adopted for securing the smart city has largely been one of conventional,
largely technical mitigation solutions, such as access controls, encryption, IT industry
Figure 1. A demonstration of global cybersecurity issues in terms of open security video feeds and
webcams on the Internet. Source: Authors’ screenshot of insecam.org
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standards and security protocols, and software patching regimes, along with staff training.
While this has had some effect, given the vital nature of smart city technologies and infrastruc-
tures to urban life, we contend that securing such systems requires a wider set of systemic
interventions that encompass mitigation (lessening the force or intensity of something occur-
ring) and prevention (stopping something from happening or arising), and ensures enactment
through both market-led initiatives and governance-led regulation and enforcement.
Conventional Mitigation Solutions
As noted, smart city technologies typically present large attack surfaces that expose a
number of potential vulnerabilities, especially in control systems that contain legacy com-
ponents using old software which has not been regularly patched. The typical approach to
securing smart city systems has been to utilize a suite of well-known technical solutions
and software security approaches to try and prevent access and to enable restoration if
a compromise occurs. For example, the use of access controls (username/password,
two-stage authentication, biometric identifiers), properly maintained firewalls, virus and
malware checkers, end-to-end strong encryption, and procedures to ensure routine soft-
ware patching and ability to respond with urgent updates to close exploits as they occur,
audit trails of usage and change logs, and effective offsite backups and emergency recovery
plans (See Table 2). Using these techniques, the aim is to reduce the attack surface as much
as possible and to make the surface that is visible robust and resilient and quickly recover-
able in case of failure. Where feasible, systems should have built-in redundancy to ensure
that if the primary delivery of a critical system fails, a secondary system automatically takes
its place. Such redundancy might include the use of decentralized cloud-based solutions
(where data and computation is distributed across sites) or a completely separate techno-
logical solution. While an optimal solution, it is also the case that creating genuine redun-
dancy is often difficult and expensive. Indeed, the extent to which the protections detailed
in Table 2 are available varies across technologies and vendors; and the application across
different institutions and companies is also inconsistent. Moreover, in complex, distribu-
ted systems with many components these solutions need to work equally across the com-
plete system since the whole infrastructure/enterprise is only as strong as the weakest link.
Further, it is often the case that these kinds of solutions are layered on after a system has
been developed rather than being “baked-into” the design.
Table 2. Standard technical aspects of software system security
Access Updating Functionality Design
Effective end-to-end
encryption on all
communications
Up-to-date virus and malware checkers Disabling unnecessary
functionality
Isolating trusted
resources from non-
trusted
Enforce strong
passwords and access
controls
Automatically installing security patch
updates on all components, including
firmware, software, communications,
and interfaces
Ensuring full backup
of data and recovery
mechanisms
Ensuring that there are
no weak links between
components
Firewalls Implementing fail safe
and manual overrides
on all systems
Audit trails Ensuring redundancy of
systems where feasible
Source: Authors, derived from Martínez-Ballesté et al., 2013 and Cerrudo, 2015
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These technical solutions are often bolstered by a vigilant IT staff whose job it is to
oversee the day-to-day maintenance of these systems, including monitoring security
issues and reacting swiftly to new cyberattacks and breaches. In addition, non IT-staff
across an organization can be trained to maintain good practices with respect to security,
such as adopting stronger passwords, routinely updating software, encrypting files, and
avoiding phishing attacks. However, training is often conducted only once and ongoing
staff compliance with best practice is not monitored.
While these security measures have genuine utility, they are far from a complete sol-
ution, particularly as smart technologies become ever more critical to the smooth func-
tioning of cities. Instead, a more systemic approach needs to be adopted in relation to
both technical design and training. In particular, a security-by-design approach that is
proactive and preventative, rather than reactive and remedial, needs to be employed by
city governments and key institutions responsible for urban management and infrastruc-
ture provision. Security-by-design seeks to build strong security measures into systems
from the outset rather than attempting to layer them on after initial development. This
requires security risk assessment to be a fundamental part of the design process and all
aspects of security systems to be rigorously tested before the product is sold (Lomas,
2015); including a pilot phase within a living lab environment that includes testing the
security of a product when deployed in real-world contexts and operating as part of a
wider network of technologies (to ensure end-to-end security). It also means having in
place an ongoing commitment to cybersecurity, including a mechanism to monitor pro-
ducts throughout their life cycle, a process of supporting and patching them over time, and
a procedure for notifying customers when security risks are identified. With respect to
existing city software systems and control infrastructure, all vendors should be asked
for full security documentation and procedures, and a comprehensive testing of their
security should be undertaken to identify weak points, undertake remedial security patch-
ing, and to upgrade future service level agreements with respect to enhanced security. This
is especially the case for legacy systems. If systems cannot be remedially fixed and forever-
day exploits remain that could bring down critical systems, then firm plans need to be put
in place for upgrades or replacement.
With respect to overseeing the security aspects of smart city technologies we would
advocate the formation of a core security team within urban administrations with special-
ist skills and responsibilities above and beyond day-to-day IT-administration. The work of
this team would include: undertaking wide-ranging threat and risk modelling; actively
testing the security of smart city technologies (rather than simply monitoring and trusting
vendor reassurances); conducting ongoing security assessments; preparing and reviewing
detailed plans of action for different kinds of cybersecurity incidents; liaising with the city
departments and companies administering smart city initiatives; and coordinating staff
training on security issues. The staff would also constitute a city’s Computer Emergency
Response Team to actively tackle any on-going cybersecurity incidents (Cerrudo, 2015).
As a routine part of their work, the core security team should consult with cybersecurity
vendors to stay up-to-date on potential threats and solutions (Nanni, 2013). In addition,
the team should create a formal channel for security feedback and ethical disclosure,
enabling bugs and security weaknesses to be reported by members of the consultants, aca-
demics, and allied technology companies. Initial security assessments would be carried out
as early as possible, for example in the scoping and procurement phases of technological
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adoption, to ensure the solutions developed conform to expectations. Part of any assess-
ment should be a consideration of whether systems should be kept in siloes to limit
cascade effects. Given cost constraints and lack of strategic foresight, very few cities pre-
sently have core security teams or CERTs and are therefore underprepared to deal with a
serious cyberattack.
In addition, a step-change in education and training vis-à-vis cybersecurity is required
for all those involved in smart city ventures. Within local government and public service/
infrastructure providers, advanced security training should be developed and
implemented across the organization, but especially for those involved in the procure-
ment, rollout, and daily running of smart city technologies. This is important because
although a system might have an extensive and robust set of technical security solutions
these can be nullified by social exploits or human error. Similarly, such programs should
be instituted for developers and vendors to stress the need for a security-by-design
approach, especially for start-ups and SMEs who might not have the in-house capacity
for security expertise. In both cases, training needs to be part of a continual program of
professional development to refresh best practice and keep abreast of new technologies
and vulnerabilities. We have found very little evidence of such system-wide security
training programs other than relatively light introductory courses, often taken on a
one-off basis.
Enactment and Enforcement
While it is one thing to advocate for stronger mitigation measures, it is another to ensure
that a more systemic approach to cybersecurity for smart cities is widely enacted and
enforced. Therefore, there is a need to think about the most appropriate mechanisms to
incentivize participation by both the public and commercial sector, and to penalize
those who fail to improve security of their products, systems, and services. In general,
there are two routes to improving mitigation measures: market-led adoption and govern-
ment-led regulation and legal enforcement.
The market-led approach consists of vendors developing smart city technologies taking
a proactive, self-regulatory stance to security. Here, software companies choose to adopt
security-by-design as a de facto standard, collaborate with each other to create effective
industry-wide standards, and establish best practices. They ensure security across
complex, interdependent systems, and work more closely with the rapidly growing cyber-
security industry in order to improve their products. In so doing, security becomes an
expected norm and the adoption of a serious approach to security by companies provides
competitive advantage over those that do not comply. In part, the market-led approach
would be driven by competition; fear of reputational damage and litigation caused by a
major security scandal; and the benefits of self-regulation, rather than the approach of
enforcement through legal penalties and fines. While a market-led approach to security
does presently exist, it predominately adopts the weak mitigation approach detailed
above and not security-by-design. In part this is because there is currently weak pressure
from buyers for enhanced security, mainly due to a poor understanding of security vulner-
abilities and their potential consequences and inadequate procurement practices. More-
over, the imperatives to get product to market as quickly as possible (often to pre-empt
a competitor) and turn a profit mean that security corners are being cut. As such,
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market-led responses should be accompanied by more “top-down” regulation and better
management practices by city authorities and urban infrastructure operators.
The regulation and management-led approach seeks to encourage secure deployment
of smart city technologies through compliance measures and active oversight. The
former requires the formulation of security standards, directives, and best practices that
smart city deployments must comply with or face some form of penalty, such as prosecu-
tion, fines, or loss of contract. There are now a host of smart city standards initiatives
underway—by bodies such as the International Standards Organization, British Standards
Institute, American National Standards Institute, City Protocol—aimed at defining
minimum specifications for technical development and deployment of core technologies.
The latter necessitates setting up management structures and procedures for ensuring
compliance is being met and enforced. For example, large public bodies that are operating
the European Union have to institute an audit and risk committee that identifies vulner-
abilities and monitors potential threats to an organization and oversees mitigation strat-
egies. These are often broad in scope and could benefit from a sub-committee focused
specifically on software security and network threats. This sub-committee should
oversee and audit the work of the core security team; advise on the work priorities and
program; certify security assessments; certify that the city’s smart city technologies
conform to legal and regulatory requirements; ensure that response and mitigation
plans and processes are in place; and ensure there is clear communication to the public
concerning the security of smart city systems (Nanni, 2013). In addition, city adminis-
trations should bake security-by-design and on-going security maintenance (including
on-time patching and 24/7 incident response) into the procurement process and sub-
sequent service level contracts, with the extent to which the proposed solutions meet
desired parameters directly influencing the evaluation of tenders (Cerrudo, 2015). They
should also support whistleblowers who wish to expose security vulnerabilities and
require the public reporting of security breaches.
We have found no example of a city that presently enacts such systemic, enhanced
security oversight or procurement beyond seeking existing mitigation strategies. For the
most part this is due to a lack of in-depth knowledge and competence, and institutional
inertia. Consequently, smart city technologies have been in the past and are still being
procured with little coordinated consideration of security harms and slotted into existing
city management in an ad hoc fashion with minimal strategic foresight. Given the
potential harms and the associated costs that can arise, this piecemeal and make-do
approach needs to be discontinued to be replaced with a more systemic and coordinated
approach.
A Preventative Approach
Even with a strong mitigation strategy and effective enforcement procedures, it is not poss-
ible to eradicate all the security vulnerabilities and associated risks from the smart city.
There is, therefore, a case to be made for considering a preventative approach, one that
involves building some urban infrastructure and control systems that are deliberately
“deaf” (not networked and remotely accessible) and “dumb” (i.e., not automated by
code), which would elide many software security overheads. A preventative approach is
quite straightforward to articulate—simply put, “do not adopt smart city technologies
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as presently conceived;” the best way to prevent risks from materializing is not to create
vulnerabilities in the first place.
Yet making the case for such an approach is much more difficult in practice because
of the perceived benefits of creating a smart city. Such a cautious, preventative
approach, that questions seriously the commercial logics and profit streams of many
hardware vendors and software developers, will be labelled “backward looking” and
“out-of-date,” and derided for having a neo-Luddite mentality (See Jones, 2013).
Indeed, at present, advocating a preventative approach would be considered a radical
means of securing smart cities as it requires a reframing of the value around technology
and a rethinking of the balance between convenience/efficiency and security/safety. It
requires a counter-narrative against “smarter is better” and advocacy for conventional
electro-mechanical components and systems that run reliably without additional soft-
ware monitoring and network access.
There is a case, however, to be made that the potential risks networked infrastructure
pose, plus the cybersecurity, management and training costs of ensuring security, out-
weigh the efficiency and functionality gains promised and the “inconveniences” of main-
taining “air-gapped” technologies (that is, systems that are physically isolated from other
networks). Having to send a person physically to a component to re-activate it, reconfigure
settings, or repair it might seem costly and burdensome when it could be done remotely.
Indeed, in the era of ubiquitous connectivity, cloud-computing, integrated and interoper-
able systems, and remote control, the notion of having an air gap in critical systems might
seem counter-intuitive. However, it can be an effective method of security that prevents
hacking and cascade effects and significantly reduces vulnerabilities.
Equally, there are reasons to be skeptical of the benefits claimed by advocates (who are
often self-interested) for new cyber-physical systems as it is well noted that they tend to
oversell the promises of smart city technologies while ignoring their perils (Townsend,
2013; Greenfield, 2013; Kitchin, 2014; Datta, 2015). Certainly, many existing smart city
system deployments have not delivered the anticipated gains in efficiency, flexibility, pro-
ductivity and convenience; in many cases, especially with regards to the IoT, objects and
systems have been digitally networked for little perceivable gain or real benefits to the
functioning and management of cities (though they benefit vendors through their sale/ser-
vicing and potential monetization of data streams). In fact, if anything, some newly soft-
ware-enabled systems make routine tasks more complex to complete, error-prone,
unreliable, stressful, costly in time and cognitive attention, and less secure, as well as
raising issues with respect to excessive surveillance and privacy (Greenfield, 2013;
Kitchin, 2016). In other words, networking city infrastructure and introducing new
systems do not necessarily improve performance, yet they do make them more vulnerable
to security risks.
Nonetheless, at present, implementing preventative measures will be difficult to
promote and promulgate given the widespread adoption of techno-utopian discourses
of “progress” enacted by smart urbanism. This is especially the case in the current neolib-
eral climate that encourages cities to form public-private partnerships with companies and
to outsource or privatize services, and where access to government grants will be difficult
without claiming to create and implement innovative and cutting-edge smart city sol-
utions. This may change though if the “cutting-edge” of city management becomes recog-
nized as the “bleeding-edge” of insecurity.
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Conclusion
In this paper we have examined in-depth the current state of play with regards to the
security of smart cities. In an ironic twist, smart city technologies are promoted as an effec-
tive way to counter and manage uncertainty and risk in present-day cities, yet they para-
doxically create new risks, including making city infrastructure and services insecure,
brittle, and open to extensive forms of vandalism, disruption and criminal exploitation.
This paradox has largely been ignored by commercial and governmental interests or
tackled through a traditional mitigation approach. This is perhaps no surprise. Although
we have identified five forms of vulnerability and detailed the present extent of cyberat-
tacks on city infrastructure and services, presenting a number of illustrative examples
where they have been compromised, as far as is publicly known, the majority of attacks
are presently being repulsed using cybersecurity software tools and management practices,
or their effects have been only locally disruptive or damaging but not critical for the long-
term delivery of services (Singer and Friedman, 2014). Indeed, despite widespread, low-
level attempts, successful cyberattacks on city systems are still relatively rare and when
they have occurred their effects generally last no more than a few hours or involve the
theft of data rather than creating life-threatening situations. That said, even short-term
disturbances, such as shutting down the electricity grid for a few hours or causing
traffic gridlock, can be an expensive disruption through lost productivity and opportu-
nities, and can also be potentially life-threatening. They also signal the threat of more
damaging cyberattacks in coming years as actors develop more sophisticated methods
of hacking, and security measures fail to keep pace.
Indeed, it is clear that smart city technologies presently have multiple vulnerabilities
and that these are and will be exploited for various ends. Moreover, there is a cybersecurity
“arms race” underway between attackers and defenders, and it may be that more severe
disruption of critical infrastructure has so far been avoided because nation-state actors
do not want to reveal their capabilities and they fear retaliation from adversaries
(Rainie et al., 2014). In other words, smart city technologies are vulnerable to cyberattack
and cyberterrorism and existing vulnerabilities are only likely to increase in the future. In
our view, present strategies for addressing the vulnerabilities and risks posed by the mass
adoption of networked technologies for city management are woefully inadequate
and predominantly rely on existing technical and training mitigation strategies and
market-led solutions.
Instead, we advocate a widening and deepening of mitigation strategies to include
security-by-design as a de facto approach for all future smart city procurement, a compre-
hensive assessment of existing urban infrastructures and information systems and reme-
dial security patching or replacement, the formation of core security and computer
emergency response teams within city administrations with specialist skills and responsi-
bilities beyond general IT-administration, and a step-change in security training and con-
tinuing professional development in both public and commercial sectors. This should be
complemented by a management and regulation approach to smart city technologies and
implementation, rather than simply a market-led approach, to ensure active oversight and
compliance with security standards, best practices, municipal policy, and third-party
service contracts. We also suggest that serious consideration be given to a preventative
approach to security, wherein critical infrastructure is air-gapped or not given the
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“smart” treatment when it is not really needed. In addition, the use of new technical sol-
utions to access, control, and authentication, such as the use of blockchains, warrant
examination (see Christidis and Devetsikiotis, 2016).
It is self-evidently too late to roll-back the smart city agenda, and much of the adoption
of smart city technologies by municipal authorities across the world cannot simply be
removed. However, it is not too late to recognize the extent of the new security vulnerabil-
ities, threats, and risks posed by these technologies and to put in place strategies and
approaches to mitigate and prevent them. We believe that not enough is presently
being done by vendors and city administrators to identify vulnerabilities and risks and
to formulate effective responses. Moreover, infrastructural and city system security
issues are largely being ignored within the social sciences and urban studies, the conse-
quence of which is to leave the formulation of solutions largely to computer and engineer-
ing sciences and market-solutions which favor technical and for-profit approaches rather
than more policy, governance, and for-public-good tactics. Securing smart cities requires a
holistic understanding of a city as a diverse, contested set of places, rather than constitut-
ing a system of systems. It necessitates a comprehension of the reasons why vulnerabilities
exist and how they might be tackled beyond technical fixes; the potential social and econ-
omic consequences of risks being realized; and how risks and potential solutions are con-
textualized within the acting regime and political economy of urban development and
management. While we have sought to examine the security of smart cities from a norma-
tive perspective, this undoubtedly needs to be complemented with a wider social, political,
and economic analysis of security issues and smart urbanism.
Notes
1. Computer hacking culture has a long history and with diverse and contested meanings (Levy,
1984), but the term has come typically to be applied to those with malicious or criminal
intent.
2. The IoT is a fast-developing set of identification and technologies that connect together for-
mally “dumb” physical objects and make them addressable through the internet and potential
facilitate all manner of new activities and processes in relation to these objects, often in highly
automated and autonomous fashion. As such, IoT is the critical element in the creation of
what Dodge and Kitchin have called the “machine-readable world.”
3. This is a publicly known code error in a software product that the vendor is not able to or is
not intending to fix, consequently there is no means of patching the software.
4. These comprise a small physical electronic circuit and antenna that can be fix to physical
objects and automatically broadcast a globally unique identification code number when
queried by appropriate radio signal: See Frith, 2015.
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